I have Windows 7 Ultimate x64, but I think this might be problem in any version. I keep having issues with MsMpEng.exe using a large amount of resources, like 100% CPU time or a lot of memory.  The system will work just fine, even after running for hours, when suddenly the system slows to a crawl, almost to the point I have to reset the system.  I finally narrowed the culprit to MsMpEng.exe, the scanner for MSSE. 

I found a link on a Google search about adding exclusions, which I suspected would be a problem for things like my backup programs.  I added Crashplan and Syncback programs already, but what I found in that Google search was that you need to add the MSSE directories in C:\ProgramData to the exclusion list.  WHAT!!???  Are you kidding me?  MSSE doesn’t already exclude itself?  Come on MS!!  I really like MSSE,  but that’s pretty stupid.

I went ahead and added these to MSSE exclusions:

C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Microsoft Antimalware

C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Microsoft Security Essentials

C:\Program Files\Microsoft Security Essentials

Now, for a couple days, I have had no more issues!!!  We’ll see in a week if it really fixes it.  That’s an easy fix, but completely annoying!  I still like MSSE regardless.  It’s not perfect, but I’d rather have it than anything else. 

I am curious to know if anyone else found this fix to work?

Note:  I do recommend people run a manual scan with MalwareBytes and SuperAntispyware once in a while, along with the real time scanner in MSSE.  MSSE didn’t catch a recent trojan at one of my clients, same one was blocking MalwareBytes too.  Only SuperAntispyware cleaned the system properly.

This is just another one of those things that didn’t make any sense and only partially does now. At least NOW I know there is more at play here than the simple solutions in Samba using create mask and create directory mask. In Linux, that’s how I would get around the issues of Windows directory permissions running on a Linux SMB share.

Now, I am learning to do things the OpenSolaris way. I am loving OpenSolaris and ZFS! However, coming from a Linux and Windows “way of life”, there are some differences that just aren’t clear. What kills me is, I try the RTFM thing, and somehow completely miss that one little thing that makes it all work. Off topic, but an example, coming from Linux, I would just type “su” and get root access. In OpenSolaris, that won’t work. Neither will “pfexec su”, nor “sudo su”. Then one day, after dealing with it for a week or so, I stumble upon a post where someone in an unrelated sample script typed “pfexec su – root”. There ya go! Argh!

Anyway, back on the ZFS/CIFS/ACL thing. It was driving me nuts that I couldn’t figure it out. I wanted a folder with this setup:
/pool/sharefs – owner:greg – group:domusers
greg and domusers should have full control and all folders under “sharefs” should inherit that.

So under linux/samba, that’s where I would do like “create mask = 770″ or simlar, and “force create group = domusers”. Something like that, can’t remember exactly. made it simple actually. It always wrote files with the right perms and ownership and other people in that group could read/write just fine.

Problem is, you can’t get very specific about who get’s what, where, and you can’t use more than one group. Well, sure enough, there’s a thing called “ACL” that handles that stuff now. It’s been around for a while now, but I never even heard of it until I started using OpenSolaris. I like how it seems to be more compatible with the way Windows handles ACL’s. What I don’t like is, it’s confusing. I get the NTFS/Share perms in Windows, been doing that a long time now. The CIFS/ZFS ACL thing kind of makes sense, and it will “click” at some point the more I use it.

After spending hours on this, I reached a point where I had to figure it out. Here’s what I did.

On the ZFS file system, create it normally for SMB access. Then I changed some properties for aclinherit and aclmode. Change those to “passthrough”:
zfs set -o aclinherit=passthrough -o aclmode=passthrough pool/sharefs

Then chmod/chown. OH! That’s another thing. You need to use /bin/chmod and /bin/ls! Not just type: chmod … That wont work. In OpenSolaris the default path points to /usr/gnu/bin/chmod, which doesn’t have the “A” or “V” options to set/view ACL’s. That was another thing that DROVE ME CRAZY!!! I read the man pages and manuals and docs online and I didn’t catch anything that said, “Hey, there are different versions of chmod and ls here!” I can’t believe the time wasting here! Back to the point, do this to put your own default perms on:

/bin/chmod 2774 /pool/sharefs
(I actually am not positive that is needed, but I think it set group as inheritable)

/bin/chmod -R A- /pool/sharefs
(that will wipe out the current perms)

/bin/chmod -R A=owner@:full_set:fd:allow /pool/sharefs
(resets perms with only that acl)

/bin/chmod -R A+group@:full_set:fd:allow /pool/sharefs
(that appends the group perms, full control)

/bin/chmod -R A+everyone@:read_set:fd:allow /pool/sharefs
(above appends everyone read access)

In all the above that will preset INHERITABLE permissions for the subdirectories.  Notice above there is one with “A=” on it?  That will reset the perms and set only that perm.  So I guess you may not even need the previous line for “A-” to reset.  (I am just learning here ya know!)

It looks as if that makes a little sense now.  You can view the current ACL’s like so:  ”/bin/ls -V /pool/sharefs”

In my case, I might want to add another user or group:

/bin/chmod -R A+user:stacy:full_set:fd:allow /pool/sharefs
/bin/chmod -R A+group:othergroup:full_set:fd:allow /pool/sharefs
/bin/chmod -R A+group:yetanothergroup:read_set:fd:allow /pool/sharefs

So with this setup I can now open the share on the server and create a file or folder with inherited permissions.  It does, however, save my username as a new owner, so keep that in mind.  But if the group stays in there with “domusers” as full read/write access, I am happy.

Well, now I get it just a little and it makes more sense compared to Windows ACL’s.  I didn’t go over any share specifics and authentication issues, this was just ACL’s!  I still have to RTFM my way around that for a while.  Next project, join OpenSolaris to a Windows domain.  (Which, BTW, does not work in NT Domain style connections, you have to use Active Directory.)

When using Folder Redirection on a Windows 2003 server, the default policy is allow only ownership and permissions to the user. No admin account would have access to this folder. For example, you create a Group Policy to redirect user’s My Documents folders to a home directory on the server. Once a user logs on and this policy is applied, the folder is created with ownership of the user only, and file permissions granted for that user only, too.

This has presented a big problem for me, having come from Windows 2000, where this was not the case. As you might guess, when only the user has permissions specified, no administrator can get access to this folder for backup purposes. Our backups always failed.

Well then, on Windows 2003 Server, two default policies are in place making the user’s folders more secure. Nice, but I don’t care. I want backup rights by default. Go into the Group Policy where you would like to define the new policy. I made a new Organizational Unit and put all my computers in there, so I could define the policy at a lower level, instead of at the domain level. Once into and editing you policy, drill down to here:
Computer Configuration –
Administrative Templates -
System –
User Profiles –

In here look for these two policies and enable them:
“Do not check for user ownership of Roaming Profile Folders”
“Add the Administrators security group to roaming user profiles”

Now this will allow Windows 2003 to behave more like Windows 2000 on the redirected folders. Unfortunately, there is one issue. It does not change permissions on previously created folders, only on newly created folders. That’s a pain, but not that big a deal, because I can probably script some folder moves and recreate them.

Also, even though this says “Roaming” in the policy items, they apply to local and roaming accounts.  So even if your users are normal, non-roaming profiles, you still need to set.  In my case, we did not have any roaming profiles and only used folder redirection OR simply had home folders mapped from the server.  Doing either of those had the same permissions problem and the policies mentioned solved the issue. (except for previously created folders, it only changes on newly created folders after the policy change.)

Recently I went to reset a user’s home directory permissions on the server to allow them full control over each file/folder in their home directory. I setup all the normal accounts and of course the actual user account, with Full Control. I then went into Advanced and selected “Replace permission entries on all child objects” and hit apply.

This seemed to work fine, except the user complained that they could not access the documents in certain subfolders. When I checked those subfolders, the permissions were correct, except for her account had no permissions specified. Essentially this means, no perms, no access. So I tried again, same result.

The solution was simple, though, I can’t figure out why this was configured this way. At the root folder you wish to start inheritance, go into advanced under security on that folder. Go into Advanced again, and under Permissions, highlight the user in question, and click Edit. Under the detailed Permission Entry window, at the very bottom is a checkbox for:

“Apply these permissions to objects and/or containers within this container only.”

Uncheck that! And apply the permissions once more. All child objects should now have all the correct permissions! Yay!

I don’t understand why this is set this way. Is there a Group Policy in place I don’t know about? Did a previous IT guy change that? At least I have a solution. J

I love how people always say that a software firewall like IPCop is a “lesser” product than a hardware system. I ran into one site speaking of Netsentron as a hardware solution. I’d also include Endian Firewall and Untangle when we talk about a “linux based hardware firewall”. Well here’s my thought. These systems offer a hardware solution, but aren’t these products really the same thing as the downloaded software version they provide? And if so, these products are really only a “hardware/software bundle”, right? (I think they actually advertise them this way anyway, but my gripe is with all those techs out there under the notion that these are real hardware based products.)

I can’t comment on any Cisco or Sonicwall, hardware firewalls, because I have not used any of them. But are these also just software running on hardware? And the main thing I’ve heard from security people about the lesser quality software products is that they are not good at defending against DOS attacks. Is this really true? Even if so, in the last 10 years I’ve ran some sort of Linux based firewall, whether home-brewed or special firewall distribution, I’ve not once had a break in. I’ve not once had a DOD attack. (THIS IS NOT AN INVITATION!)

Now, I have had a DOD attack directly on and Exchange or IIS server that was port forwarded directly to the Internet. Not pretty! Which is a big reason why I don’t run these systems directly anymore. But this is off topic. (maybe another blog coming!)

I’ll do some of my own research, but maybe if someone out there can shed some light on the deficiencies of a Linux firewall, in particular IPCop or Smoothwall. For my use, IPCop with a few addons, make for a fantastic filtering firewall, provided we pick good hardware to run it, and configure it properly. Is Sonicwall truly better at providing security?

Ah, just thinking out loud again. I am sure someone out there will give me hell for saying things like this. I am not a security expert, not even close. But, sometimes I just wonder about things… J

First thing, when you clone your Linux hard drive with Ghost or Drive Image (or any other imaging software) you might not be able to load Grub. Usually just running some Grub commands off a Linux System Rescue CD will fix it. I think most any bootable Linux Live CD will work. You would run these commands:

After boot, run “grub”. (the following lines are from the “grub>” prompt.)

……………………

find /boot/grub/stage1

    (hd0,0)

root (hd0,0)

setup (hd0)

quit

……………………

You would replace “root (hd0,0)” with whatever is output from the find command above. The above assumes you have /boot on the same root partition.

On IPCop, boot is on a separate partition. So you need to be a little fancier. The key is to tell it what device to use. In the example below, we will assume we know what drive the boot record is on. (hd0,0). Also note, that IPCop because IPCop has boot on a separate partition, running the find command would be like so:

find /grub/stage1

Ok, so using the device command, and since we know our root is on hd0 …
(all on the grub prompt)

……………………

device (hd0) /dev/hda

root (hd0,0)

setup (hd0)

quit

……………………

Now grub should load ok. This would apply to most images/clones made, I think. But, now, what if your distro uses symlinks to represent your hard drives? I ask, because this stopped me from running IPCop off an image. Took me a while to realize two things.

1. IpCop uses symlinks for /dev/harddisk instead of /dev/hda. (Can someone tell me why they do that? Why change that? Every other Linux distro I have used uses /dev/hda1 for the first partition on IDE drive.)
2. When I cloned the system, the grub.conf (also known as menu.lst on other systems) listed the root filesystem as /dev/hda4, and yet, there was no hda4 in dev directory. It didn’t even exist on the old drive, so I have no idea how IpCop was booting!

Solution to #2 above was again to boot to a Linux Live CD, mount the boot partition on hda1, edit grub.conf and change all the /dev/hda4 entries to /dev/hda3, where the root filesystem actually resided.

On number #1 above, I don’t think fixing it actually caused the system to boot, but I did it anyway. While booted to the Live CD, I edited the /etc/fstab file on the hard drive and changed all the entries for /dev/harddisk1 through 3, to point to /dev/hda1 through 3. There is probably a reason for them doing this, but ya got me why. ?? Changing this might bite me it the butt some day, but for now, it boots beautifully!

Oh, and one might ask, why make a drive image of IPCop when they provide a backup and restore feature using floppy? Well, here’s why: 1. I have a ton of add-on programs installed, and they don’t backup. 2. I like an image better than a floppy!

IpCop is an awesome system, and I’ve had zero problems with it over many years now. But, it doesn’t do enough by itself. I mostly like the BlockOutTraffic addon you can install, giving you detailed control over all communication. I also modify the SSH setup to work the way I like it, using certificate auth and custom ports for several users tunneling into our networks. (works way better than VPN!) On some networks, I have to use PopTOP, the PPTP addon for Ipcop VPN. (not by my choice, it’s a requirement by an application we use.) All these might not backup to a floppy, and it’s so fast to make a Ghost image of the drive. You just have to spend a few extra minutes during restore.

Note: I was using IPCop 1.4.16 during all this.

EDIT 10/22 (later that evening…)

For IPCop, YOU MUST boot to an existing drive on /dev/hda that contains a working copy of IPCop and have your newly cloned drive operational as /dev/hdc. When you run grub, and then all the device, root and setup commands, you need to do it like so.

……………………

device (hd0) /dev/hdc

root (hd0,0)

setup (hd0)

quit

……………………

Notice the /dev/hdc above? Don’t ask me why, but when you try to run this from a Live CD, it won’t work. I really would like to know though, because the fact that it doesn’t work drives me nuts. There must be a simple explanation, and I know it’s just my ignorance of the grub boot loader, but this shouldn’t be needed. (and yet it is!) I just don’t have time to figure it out, when I can simply boot an IPCop as hda and run this quickly. Sometimes it is easier to not ask why, and move on. So make a note of this, YOU MUST boot to and IPCop OS with your new drive installed, then run the grub setup. Stupid, but at least it works.

I fought with this one for a while, like several hours. I installed the pptp addon for IPCop, which, by the way, you must Google for. I installed version 0.2.9 (pptpd_0.2.9.tar.gz) and found that on a forum somewhere. If you go to the addon’s from IPCop, you will only find 0.2.6, and that wont work with 1.4.13 or higher. (I might have that version a bit off, but I think that’s right) So Google for that file and you should find the file and ftp server IP. I don’t want to provide that, because I don’t have permission to do so.

Anyway, back to the problem. The pptp addon installed just fine on IPCop, and the admin web gui showed the correct items. I could not, however, get Windows to connect. I always got a 619 error, like that is helpful! On the IPCop /var/log/messages, I found this:
pptpd[5740]: GRE: read(fd=5,buffer=804dc00,len=8196) from PTY failed: status = -1 error = Input/output error

You can see the details on the pptpclient help page:

http://pptpclient.sourceforge.net/howto-diagnosis.phtml#read_eproto

I didn’t know how to do their troubleshooting, especially on IPCop. But then it occurred to me, find pppd, and ask it for help!

I ran this: /opt/pptp/sbin/pppd –help
Returned: /opt/pptp/sbin/pppd: error while loading shared libraries: libpcap.so.0.8.3: cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory

Ah-HA!!!

Run this on IPCop 1.4.15 while in the /usr/lib directory: ln -s libpcap.so.0.9.5 libpcap.so.0.8.3

BINGO! Windows can connect! From Vista no less!

Oh, and I know that PPTP is not the best as far as security goes, but it is the only thing I can use. I am running several Wifi Palm devices with a PPTP client on them for Hotsyncing on the Internet. I realize there is another product available that uses IPSec, but that is quite expensive per device. Plus that solution might run into a lot more hassle for the users while on the road trying to connect over hotspots, because IPSec may be blocked. PPTP is just more compatible. I’d really prefer to have an SSL based VPN on the Palm, but I don’t know of one available. So, for now, I’ll at least suffer with PPTP instead of opening my hotsync up to the world. Not perfect, but I can lock down the connection with IPcop too. (sounds like another blog… J )

When opening files on the network over mapped drive OR UNC, you receive a “publisher” or “security” warning before running the file. Very annoying.

In IE, you add the server or domain to your “local intranet” security zone. In my case, my server was: main.domain.local
It was mapped on O: drive.

So in the zone I added:
\\main
O:\
domain.local
\\domain.local

That took care of all kinds of connections.

On a domain wide setting: In active directory, I added a group policy for the file types of moderate security.

Go to a domain policy, I did the Default Domain Policy on mine. > Open User Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Attachment Manager.

And edit the item: Inclusion List for Moderate Risk file types

Add: .doc;.xls;.exe;.pdf
(just the most common, you might want more)

Add the type you want to exclude from the security warning. Reboot the client computer, or run gpupdate on it to get the new policy. Problem went away for me!

Gregs Uberfast version:

Linux:

openssl genrsa -des3 -out CA.key 1024
openssl req -new -key CA.key -x509 -days 3650 -out CA.crt
chmod 400 CA.key
chmod 400 CA.crt

(the above made a new CA, you want to install the crt into IE’s trusted certs.)

Win:

Make cert request in IIS – take to Lin.

Linux:

(All one line)
openssl x509 -req -days 3650 -in certreq.txt -CA CA.crt
-CAkey CA.key -CAcreateserial -out mail.server.crt

Win:

Take that mail.server.crt and install in IIS. People browsing yoru site will get a “not valid CA” type error, especially in IE7, and they’ll need to accept that. Otherwise, you need to buy a real cert. If it’s only your users on the site, then just have them install the CA.crt into IE, as then they will trust the authority/key from the web server. Every user will need to do that.

I am not expert on these things (encryption), but I have done some reading and found some issues with Encrypted File System I don’t like. I may not describe the issues correctly, so this is just my opinion more than anything.

1. In Windows 2000, don’t even bother. It can be bypassed with their recovery agent or administrator. So if you lose your laptop, the data can be accessed.

2. In XP, it is better and more secure. I think there is no data recovery agent, but I think a local administrator account on a non-domain install of XP will still have the private keys.

3. The private keys are on that hard drive!

4. You still see all the files. The file names are all viewable, and that may be a security risk for some companies. It’s better than nothing, but I don’t like that too much.

5. You can’t encrypt the whole system. Or a whole partition for that matter. You must encrypt a folder, and at that, only the files in that folder are encrypted.

6. Here’s the one I like least… with EFS, when you open a file, it is decrypted to a tmp file. This file is deleted once you finish with it, but as you know, files are not “wiped” from the drive when they delete, they just remove the pointer to it. So unless data is overwritten in that place of the drive, that data is accessible to anyone. If you had a spreadsheet with SSN’s or credit card numbers, and you just happen to lose your system to someone who knows what to do with it, you got a big problem!!

7. There’s more, I just can’t think of them.

Anyway, after doing some reading… I found that Bitlocker in Vista will be a very nice solution. But you have to buy Enterprise or Ultimate versions of Vista to get it. Bitlocker can encrypt the entire OS partition. Now that is nice! That is exaclty what we wanted! And if you set it up correctly, using a key or PIN at boot, it will make an extremely secure setup. One drawback, you can only encrypt the partition the OS is on, not other partitions. You’ll need to use normal EFS for them.

That’s nice, but I have Vista Business. And I don’t want to spend more money right now. Plus, on my main system and pretty much all my clients, they have 2000 and XP. Guess what I found to get me by? TrueCrypt. www.truecrypt.org. Nice product!! And it’s open-source and free!!!!

With TrueCrypt, you can password protect an entire partition with AES 256-bit encryption. You can use multiple ciphers and even key based access using a USB drive. (Bitlocker can do the USB drive thing too!) It’s a tiny program running in the systray. And in my case, I am just running a password authentication and 256bit AES on a separate partition, so my performance is pretty good too, though not as fast without encryption. Now, with XP I will be making redirections to My Documents to that private drive, and saving all my “work-in-progress” there. That, to me, operates reasonably, and pretty darn secure. I could do more to secure it, like use a key file on my usb key drive. Then you cannot get into any of my private data without the key drive inserted! But I need to test that first.

TrueCrypt can also create a virtual drive from a file.� That might be handy, but performance is just a little slower that way.� It cannot encrypt your OS partition though, which is a drag, but at least I can encrypt a separate partition and you cannot see the file system structure.� It has a lot of neat features. Definitely worth trying if you want lock down things.

Uber quick howto:  (based on Debian)
1. Make sure ssh, rsync and sudo are installed and working.
2. Add a user account,  on remote system.
2.a Add a certificate with openssl or ssh-keygen (look that up elsewhere)
2.b Make sure the cert is unencrypted with no password. Yes,  that is a slight security concern, HOWEVER, if you are very careful to secure that private key, you are ok.  In other words, don’t share it or let it out!
2.c Add your public key to your new users /home/username/.ssh/authorized_keys file.  (how to’s for this stuff are on the web)
2.d Test this user’s login and make sure it logs you in from your local machine.
3.  Now, this new user is unprivileged, so you need to use sudo for running the remote rsync command.  Add this to your remote machine /etc/sudoers file:

 nameofnewuser	remotemachinename=NOPASSWD:/usr/bin/rsync

Above, you replace with the appropriate names.

4. Copy your private key from the remote machine and save it on the local machine where you will be backing up to.  For example, save it in the local user’s .ssh directory.  /home/localuseraccount/.ssh/private.key

5. You need to create a script.  In the example below, I have an exclude.txt file also, so I can exclude directories and files.  Look that up in the rsync how-to’s.

#!/bin/bash

rsync -avz --rsync-path="sudo /usr/bin/rsync" 	

	--exclude-from=exclude.txt -e

 	"ssh -p 22 -i /home/localuseraccount/.ssh/private.key"

  	remoteuseraccount@remote.server.com:/ /backup/to/path

In case you didn’t catch that, the section above with the rsync command is all one line!

Before I get going, please comment on this. I am wanting more information, so please share.

I was wondering, though, why use a vpn to tunnel a terminal server connection? Isn’t terminal server encrypted already? Here’s a couple things that I *think* are important:

1. The vpn connection is no more secure than the terminal server. Why, if a trogan program runs on your remote client, what difference is it that you have a vpn to cover your terminal server? The attacker has access to the remote client, they now can get into your network with either system.
2. The vpn connection opens up a whole mess of insecurity if your remote client is compromised. (of course, it does with terminal server as well)
3. The data is never on the client if you use a terminal server, but with vpn, you open up your network. OUCH!
4. This is the one that really get’s me… with a vpn, if your remote client gets a nasty virus, your whole corporate network will probably now have it too once that vpn connection is opened. Not so with terminal server.
5. At least with terminal server, you can totally restrict apps and printing and such, so nothing is ever on the client, it only receives the screen shot of the server.
6. Brute forcing usernames and passwords are vulnerable on both.
7. If you were really worried about security… YOU WOULDNT RUN ANYTHING ON THE INTERNET! You wouldnt run IIS, Email, or anything else that communicates on the internet, expecially remote access services!

So from where I sit, I can’t understand how using vpn to tunnel terminal server will make my remote access more secure, in fact, possibly less secure. Please tell me if I am missing something though.

Thanks.

Greg

———————————–
Edit: 3/28/05

I have been talking about this issue with friends on forums, and I wanted to share more thoughts based on some of my posts. And just so you keep this in mind, I am basing these thoughts in the context of a small business with less than 50 users which might not even have an IT staff. A company like this typically will not spend $10-$15 thousand dollars on a VPN solution, leaving us with only the built in Microsoft technologies (or linux).

— from a post on 3/21/05 —

I dont think that vpn is less secure really, its got a great security model. What I think is less secure, is using vpn with TS. I dont believe it offers any additional protection. Why encrypt an encrypted connection? Why give access to the whole network and all the servers, if you only want them to access a few apps on 1 server? And why I think it’s less secure to run it this way? That is because the reason you run Terminal Server is to allow the user access to certain apps that would not otherwise run on a vpn, AND to isolate the use of those apps and their data. You cant isolate the processing of data and its transmissions on a vpn. The vpn essentially extends the internal network to a remote system over a public network, right? Well a TS client does not do that. It only extends the keyboard, mouse and graphics. So the data never leaves the network, it cant even be printed remotely or cut&pasted on the remote client (if you set that up of course).

So it’s not that I think vpn is less secure, implemented properly, it’s great, but only for the right purposes. For my systems, vpn wont work. I have to run apps that just wont run over a vpn, or they will but be so damn slow it just isnt practical. I installed vpn originally aboot 5 years ago at my largest client. We ran into many hurdles running our main apps. I basically determined that unless you have at least a 10 Mbit connection, dont bother. That’s not to say that apps cant work on vpn, it just depends on if they were written for it for one thing, and if not, how their execution and data is transfered. I have ran several apps that are so called ‘network’ apps, and all they do is put on a short cut to a large exe that is downloaded locally and then executed. That just wont work on vpn. It’s WAYYY too slow! Try running a 100mb + ms access mdb from remote vpn client, that then connects to a 3Gb + sql server db. Even on the fastest broadband connections, it just isnt feasible. Terminal Server solves that problem.

Now, also keep in mind, mostly why I have the ts’s is to do remote admin. Some companies have this setup: 2 servers, both are AD servers. One runs Exchange and IIS, and has MS ISA firewall on the server to vpn into and proxy out. (I didnt set that up, nor do I maintain it, I would have set it up way differently) The other server is behind that firewall and runs only a sql server internally. In this scenario, they didnt setup a dedicated firewall, and consequently are vulnerable from other sources that would put the domain controller at risk. This is because, it’s way more likely that IF an attempt were to be made to crack that server, it would be most open to attack on the IIS services, or Exchange. Once in, the firewall is useless. So… why put in the vpn here? There are so many WAY more insecure elements involved. This is why I mention in the blog… “if you’re worried about security, dont get online.” I mean, obviously your not THAT worried, or you wouldnt setup the systems that way. And if you’re not THAT worried, why use the VPN?

If I were to make the network more secure for remote admin I think I’d have to do this: Run a TS in a DMZ with admin rights to TS denied. (have to be a restricted use user acct.) Then, from the TS session, open another TS session to the specific server you want to administer. Your firewall can be set to allow communication on TS traffic to and from the dmz computer only. This way, no data is ever really sent to the remote pc, and the remote pc has not direct access to any internal system, but does have access to *view* information.

The insecurity I see, with both TS or VPN, is the client use and it’s vulnerabilities. They both suffer from the fact that IF some trojan is somehow executed and allows an unauth user remote control of the pc, that user could see all the data your company user can see. The advantage to TS in this situation, is that at least that ‘hacker’ would not have direct access to the whole network right from start. They could obviously run a keylogger and then log into that TS themselves, or from the remote pc. Same with the vpn. In my situation, the remote users use their own systems to remote into the company. They wont spend the money, nor do they have the administrative capability to maintain stringent policies and systems.

— Posted from 3/23/05 —

I found out that TS can be brute force attacked! (via password crack) (OH NO! VPN IS NEEDED!!) BUT!!!! Then I did a little more research and discovered that with my setup at my different clients, it aint gonna happen.

There is a program out there that can “dictionary attack” a Terminal Server. Not Brute Force it. There’s a difference. Dictionary attack uses a dictionary of words to test, brute force checks every letter combinatoin. That program must rely on the fact that the local “administrator” account always has local accees to the TS. And since it uses only a dictionary attack, dont use words for a password, it wont crack it. And since it relies on the admin account, rename the administrator to something else, problem solved.

Use of an 8 or more character password is also all that is needed to deter an actual brute force attack. Along with account lockout policies when logons fail, you can pretty much bet that you wont get brute force cracked. I read somewhere, that if you use 12 character passwords, and if they are only lower and uppercase, there are almost 400 BILLION BILLION combinations. And even if you could do 1 million attempts per second, it would take millions of years to crack! I am sure someone good at math can figure the details out. And this is all for just the password, YOU NEED A USERNAME TOO! Add lockouts to the mix, and it aint happening! Do some research on brute force cracking and you will see what I mean.

I read a post by someone who cracked a 6 character password with special characters in it, it was cracking something on the local machine (not networked then) and it took a day and a half to do it. Try doing that on network systems, where, if properly setup, will not allow millions of connection attempts like that.

I used to fear the “brute force” thing. Not now. And it’s not that it isnt possible, but properly configured networks/systems simply make it way too long to attempt it using current proccessing technology. that’s why higher bit encrytion is better. It takes way too much time to crack the encrypted key at 128 bits. By the time you did, the key would have changed.

Dictionary attacks are another thing, they can get a crack in minutes. But if you dont use dictionary words as passwords, then you are safe.

this all leads me to the essential wisdom of work, why do things the hard way. A hacker isnt going to try and crack something that is hard to get into, they will try the easiest route. TS and VPN are not easy to get into. They will look into which services provide the most exploits that are available to them. VPN and TS have very little exploits. (at least it was tough finding any) Try looking up exploits on your mail server or web server! I bet they’ll try getting in there way before an attempt on TS.

The amount of time involved to make these kind of attacks are huge. Script Kiddies or whatever arent going to spend that kind of time. The only way someone would do it is for money. And most likely a compititor might want the information and pay for the hacker, but holy cow, is that likely? I dont think so. It would be way easier to do some “social engineering” to infultrate the company and then get into the network.

Simple precautions on the TS are all that is needed. As with any service. 1. dont show the last user logged on. 2. restrict access to only certain users, not domain admins. 3. lockout failed login attempts. 4. long passwords 5. Change the admin name.

So I am still back to my original thought, vpn would not make ts more secure. It would only add more maintenance and head ache. But, if I already had a good vpn solution, I would utilize it.

However, I have a new thought, I guess. VPN, in certain situations that dont have stringent policies and procedures, would make remote access less secure than TS. This is because that encrypted tunnel does not get filtered by a firewall or IDS and a virus or attacker can use that connection to directly affect the entire network. With TS it is at least not possible. That’s why you have to have IT setup the remote computer and on it, restrict user actions as well. This makes VPN unattractive to me.

— and another post on 3/23/05 —

So when adding a vpn to tunnel a TS, what you are saying is, “I have a vpn, I need to tunnel it through another vpn to be more secure.” That’s like saying, “I need 2 firewalls to double up on the packet filtering.”

The only thing I think a vpn will do, and only if I had a nice hardware appliance type one, is give me device authentication. If I use MS software based vpn, especially using pptp protocol, I am no better off. I would still need to authenticate in either system (ts or vpn) and the hardware solution probably allows for IP or other device authentication. Also, I think that to really be secure you would need to use a certificate or something of that sort to authenticate. TS cant do that, so I would see that as an advantage in vpn.

If I put in a vpn, I open my whole network up. And with no real IT staff to monitor it or the client machine, that opens a whole mess of problems. At least with TS I prevent any openning of the network, only that port on that server. (no data is transfered, just user IO)

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In my situations, as in small businesses remote administration, I do believe VPN is openning a hole in the network and making it a little less secure than to provide straight access to Terminal Services. So far I have not seen any evidence to tell me otherwise, but if anyone out there can give me specific reasons to give me some evidence, please do.